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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the implications of "keeping up with the
Joneses" preferences (jealousy) for the welfare effects of monetary
policy. I develop a New Keynesian model, where households are
jealous  and  the  central  bank  follows  the  Taylor  rule.  I  show  that
the welfare effects of monetary policy over time depend
significantly on the relative strength of the consumption
externality caused by jealousy and the monopolistic distortion. If
jealousy (the monopolistic distortion) dominates, then a decrease
in the interest rate reduces (increases) welfare in the short run, but
increases (reduces) welfare in the medium run.
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1 Introduction
There is substantial evidence that individuals derive utility not only from
the level of their own consumption, but also from the consumption of the
people around them, as emphasised by Ravina (2007). Using micro level
data, Ravina nds that relative consumption or the so-called "keeping up
with the Joneses" is an important determinant of household decision making.
In addition, her ndings support the theories that explain macroeconomic
phenomena by introducing habit formation in the utility function.
The implications of habit formation for monetary policy have been analysed
e.g. by Fuhrer (2000) and Amato and Laubach (2004). Fuhrer (2000) shows
that habit formation, where utility depends on the consumers own past con-
sumption, can enhance the ability of monetary policy models to account
for the hump-shaped response of consumption to monetary shocks. Amato
and Laubach (2004) study the implications of habit formation for optimal
monetary policy.
Although the keeping up with the Joneses e¤ect might be an important
factor to explain macroeconomic phenomena, Ry¤ (2010) points out that in
the eld of monetary economics, its impact has not been studied widely.1
Pierdzioch (2003), Pierdzioch and Yener (2004) and Tervala (2007) have
analysed the implications of keeping up with the Joneses preferences for the
welfare e¤ects of monetary policy. These studies, however, have abstracted
from much that the eld of monetary economics has learned about monetary
policy modeling by analysing the e¤ects of a simple shock to the money
supply. In more sophisticated analyses of monetary policy, policy is described
in terms of rules setting the nominal interest rate.
One purpose of this study is to examine whether the welfare results of
Pierdzioch (2003), Pierdzioch and Yener (2004) and Tervala (2007) are valid
in a more sophisticated framework, where monetary policy is described in
terms of a rule setting the nominal interest rate. In addition, the previous
studies have been missing a thorough analysis of the evolution of welfare
over time. The main contribution of this paper is to go beyond the previous
studies, which employ simultaneous one-step-ahead pricing, and to analyse
the welfare e¤ects of monetary policy over time. To do this, I use a New
Keynesian model with the Calvo-pricing mechanism.
The above-mentioned studies have shown the dependence of the overall
welfare e¤ect of monetary policy on the interplay between the consumption
1The literature that addresses the relationship between economic policy and relative
consumption has dealt with a variety of topics, such as taxation in stabilisation policy
(Ljungqvist and Uhlig 2000), environmental externalities (Howarth 2006), social insurance
(Abel 2005) and income tax policy (Ireland 2001).
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externality caused by keeping up with the Joneses preferences and the mo-
nopolistic distortion. In these papers, expansionary monetary policy can be
welfare-reducing, if households are su¢ ciently jealous and the economy suf-
fers from overemployment. The reason is that in such a case, expansionary
monetary policy increases employment that is already higher than the social
optimum.
The ndings of this paper generalise the results of the earlier studies: If
the keeping up with the Joneses e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong, then expansionary
monetary policy can reduce overall welfare (the discounted present value of
welfare) also in the framework where monetary policy is modelled in terms of
an interest rate rule (the Taylor rule). More importantly, this present paper
shows that keeping up with the Joneses preferences can reverse the welfare
e¤ects of monetary policy both in the short and medium run. If the keeping
up with the Joneses e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong (weak), then expansionary
monetary policy decreases (increases) welfare in the short run. On the other
hand, if the keeping up with the Joneses e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong (weak),
then policy increases (decreases) welfare in the medium run. Thus, keeping
up with the Joneses preferences have important implications for the evolution
of welfare over time.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, I lay out the
model. In Section 3, I study the implications of keeping up with the Joneses
preferences for the welfare e¤ects of monetary policy. Section 4 concludes
the paper.
2 Model
2.1 Demand Side: Households
2.1.1 Preferences
To study the implications of jealousy for the welfare e¤ects of monetary
policy, this paper introduces keeping up with the Joneses preferences into
a New Keynesian monetary policy model (see Gali 2008, chapter 3). The
economy is populated by a continuum of households, indexed by z 2 [0; 1].
The utility function of the representative household is given by
Ut(z) = Et
1X
s=t
s t
"
log(Cs   CAs ) 
(`s (z))
2
2
#
; (1)
where Et is the expectation operator;  (0 <  < 1) is the discount factor, C
is a CES basket of all varieties consumed by the household (dened below),
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CA is average consumption goods across all households, the parameter 
captures the desire to keep up with the Joneses (as explained below),  (> 0)
is a parameter and ` stands for labour supply. The overall consumption index
is
C =
Z 1
0
c(z)
 1
 dz
 
 1
;
where c (z) is consumption of commodity z by the household and  (> 1) is
the elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated goods. The consumption-
based price index is
P =
Z 1
0
p (z)1  dz
 1
1 
;
where the price of commodity z is denoted by p (z).
To capture the idea of jealousy, parameter  is restricted to 0 <  < 1.
The utility function implies that
@Ut
@CAt
=
 
Ct   CAt
< 0:
The above equation shows that an increase in average consumption lowers
the representative households utility. In the terminology of Gali (1994) and
Dupor and Liu (2003), this property is referred as to jealousy.
The marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption can
be dened as
MRSLC =
@Ut=@`t (z)
@Ut=@Cit
:
In this model,
@MRSLC
@CAt
= `t (z) > 0:
This is a property that I dub keeping up with the Joneses, following the
terminology followed by Gali (1994) and Dupor and Liu (2003). It implies
that the marginal utility of the representative households consumption rela-
tive to leisure increases in the case where average consumption increases. As
further emphasised by Dupor and Liu (2003), if preferences reect a desire to
keep up with the Joneses, the representative household derives greater utility
from extra consumption relative to leisure in the case where other households
increase their consumption. Therefore, the household who does not take into
account the e¤ect of its behaviour on others induces an externality.
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2.1.2 Budget Constraints and Optimal Behaviour
In every period, the representative household is subject to the budget con-
straint
Dt = (1 + it)Dt 1 + wt`t(z)  PtCt + t: (2)
Here, Dt denotes one-period bonds (that pay one unit of currency in period
t + 1) held at the beginning of period t, it is the nominal interest rate on
bonds between t   1 and t, wt is the nominal wage paid to the household
in a competitive labour market and t denotes the households share of the
nominal prots (dividends) of all rms. All households own an equal share
of all rms.
The representative household maximises the utility function (1) subject
to the budget constraint (2). The optimal consumption/savings and labour
supply decisions are governed by the following equations:
EtPt+1EtCt+1 = Et(1 + it+1)PtCt; (3)
`t(z) =
wt
Pt(Ct   CAt )
; (4)
Equation (3) is the standard Euler equation: The representative household
tends to smooth consumption. Equation (4) shows that the labour supply is a
positive function of the real wage, a negative function of the households own
consumption but a positive function of average consumption. In addition,
the higher the parameter that captures the disutility of labour (), the lower
the labour supply.
2.2 Monetary Policy
The Taylor rule (Taylor 1993) implies that the central bank raises the nominal
interest rate if ination rises above the ination target or if the output gap
becomes positive. In this paper, the ination target is zero. As standard in
the New Keynesian literature, the output gap is dened as the deviation of
output from the equilibrium level that would prevail in the absence of nominal
rigidities. Therefore, in this model, the central bank responds directly to the
deviation of output from the initial steady state level.
Estimates of Taylor-type monetary policy rules typically nd a high de-
gree of interest rate smoothing. Therefore I assume that the central bank
follows the log-linear Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing
{^t = (1  1)(2Pt + 3y^t) + 1it 1 + i;t:
In this equation, the coe¢ cients 1, 2 and 3 are non-negative and chosen
by the central banks,  denotes the rst di¤erence operator and i;t is an
unpredictable shift in the monetary policy rule.
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2.3 Supply Side: Firms
Let us assume a continuum of rms, indexed by z 2 [0; 1]. Each rm produces
a di¤erentiated good with a production technology
yt (z) = `t (z) ; (5)
where yt (z) is the output of rm z and `t (z) denotes labour input used by
rm z.
Firms maximise prots taking into account the downwards-sloping de-
mand for their products. Prots are given by
t (z) = pt (z) yt (z)  wt`t (z) :
The demands for their products is given by
yt (z) =

pt (z)
Pt
 
Ct:
In the absence of nominal rigidities, rms maximise t (z) with respect
to pt (z). This implies that
pt (z) =

   1wt: (6)
An isoelastic demand function implies that the price of good z is a constant
markup over the marginal cost.
To model price rigidities, I follow the formulation of Calvo (1983). This
implies that each rm may reset its price in any given period with a proba-
bility 1   , independently of other rms and the amount of time since the
last adjustment. Therefore, in setting its price, each rm has to take into
account that there is a probability 0 <  < 1 in every subsequent period that
it will not be able to revise its price setting decision. When setting a new
price in period t, each rm maximises the present value of prots, weighting
future prots by the probability that the price will still be e¤ective in that
period. Therefore, the representative rm seeks to maximise
max
pt(z)
Vt (z) = Et
1X
s=t
s tQt;st (z) ;
where Qt;s is a stochastic discount factor between period t and period s. The
pricing rule can be written as
pt (z) =


   1
 EtP1s=t s tQt;sCs  1Ps  ws
Et
P1
s=t 
s tQt;sCs

1
Ps
  : (7)
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The log-linear version of equation (7) can be written as
p^t(z) = Etp^t+1(z) + (1  )w^t; (8)
where percentage changes from the initial steady state (denoted by the sub-
script zero) are denoted by hats; therefore, for any variable, x^t = dxt=x0.
Equation (8) shows that the optimal price is the weighted average of the
current and future marginal costs.
2.4 Symmetric Steady State
The model is log-linearised around the exible price steady state, in which
all exogenous variables are constant. The model abstracts from investment
and government spending. Therefore, consumption equals output in every
period. In addition, for simplicity, consider a symmetric equilibrium in which
the representative household consumption is average. Then, in a symmetric
equilibrium,
y0 (z) = C0 = C
A
0 :
Equations (4), (5) and (6) imply that the initial level of employment and
output is
y0(z) = `t(z) =

(   1)
 (1  )
 1
2
: (9)
As each rm has monopoly power over the commodity it produces, and house-
hold preferences feature a keeping up with the Joneses e¤ect, the level of
employment (and output) may be suboptimally low or high in the decen-
tralised competitive equilibrium. To see this, assume a social planner (SP)
internalises the consumption externality by setting C = CA and maximises
the utility of consumption net of the costs of the foregone leisure
max
`
h
log (1  ) `  
2
`2
i
:
The solution is
`SP0 =

1

 1
2
: (10)
Equations (9) and (10) demonstrate that the employment level in the de-
centralised equilibrium can di¤er from the social optimum. The comparison
between these equations reveals that
`SP0 < `0 (z) ; if  >
1

; and (11)
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`SP0 > `0 (z) ; if  <
1

: (12)
On one hand, the term (   1)= shows a distortion caused by monopolis-
tic competition. On the other hand, the keeping up with the Joneses e¤ect
increases employment (output), as a household derives greater utility from
extra consumption relative to leisure if other households increase their con-
sumotion. The relative strength of these distortions determine the level of
employment which may exceed or fall below the social optimum. Therefore,
monetary policy that increases employment may bring it closer to the social
optimum or move it even farther away from its socially optimal level.
2.5 Choice of Parameter Values
Periods are dened as quarters. Therefore, the discount factor  is set to
0:99, which implies about 4 percent annual real interest rate. The price
adjustment parameter () is set to 0.5, implying an average delay between
price adjustments of six months. This is in line with the empirical ndings of
Bils and Klenow (2004). The elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated
goods () is set equal to 6, implying a 20 percent mark-up of prices over
the marginal cost in the steady state. This value is commonly used in the
business cycle literature. The parameter that captures the disutility of labour
() is set to 1.
The interest rate smoothing parameter in the Taylor rule (1) is set to
0.8. This is consistent with the empirical ndings of Clarida et al. (2000).
In addition, 2 is set to 1:5 and 3 is set to 0:25.
I analyse the dependence of the welfare results on the parameter (),
which captures the desire to keep up with the Joneses by considering alter-
native values for it. I consider two basic values in our experiments:  = 0:1
and  = 0:2. These values are chosen because in the rst (second) case,
the employment level in the decentralised equilibrium is below (exceeds) the
social optimum (recall equations (11) and (12)).2
3 Equilibrium Dynamics
In this section, I analyse the e¤ects of an expansionary monetary policy shock,
using a log-linear version of the model. It is worth emphasising that the
parameter  does not a¤ect the log-linear version of the model. Therefore, the
keeping up with the Joneses e¤ect does not a¤ect the response of the economy
to an interest rate shock. Nevertheless, the e¤ect has signicant implications
2I solve the model using the algorithm developed by Klein (2000) and McCallum (2001).
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for welfare, as discussed below. Figure 1, on page 13, illustrates the dynamic
e¤ects of a 1 percent negative shock to the Taylor rule (i;1 =  1). In the
gure, the horizontal axes show time and the vertical axes show the variables
percentage deviations from the initial steady state.
3.1 Method of Welfare Analysis
In previous studies that have analysed the welfare e¤ects of external habit
formation  Pierdzioch (2003), Pierdzioch and Yener (2004) and Tervala
(2007)  all prices are xed for one period and the economy reaches the
new steady state after that period. Thus, the welfare e¤ect is the short-run
change in utility plus the discounted present value of the change in steady-
state utility. Since the present model uses staggered price setting, I use
a di¤erent method to analyse welfare changes. First, I study the change
in period-by-period utility. Then, I calculate the discounted present value
(DPV) of the change in utility, using a large number of periods.3
The change in utility in period t is given by
dUt(z) = C^t(z)  `20 ^`t(z):
The DPV of these changes is
dUDPV (z) =
1X
s=t
s tdUs(z):
Panel (d) of Figure 1 illustrates the changes in the periods utility, in the
cases of  = 0:1 and  = 0:2. Table 1 shows the sign of the change in the
periods utility in the 1st and 5th period and the DPV of the change in utility
for the same parameterisation considered in Figure 1. The DPV of change
in utility and the overall welfare e¤ect are used as synonymous in the text
below.
Table 1: Sign of the Welfare E¤ect of Expansionary Monetary Policy
dU1(z) dU5(z) dUDPV (z)
 = 0:1 + - +
 = 0:2 - + -
3.2 Welfare E¤ects of Monetary Policy
In the short run, the presence of staggered price setting implies that the
central banks decision to lower the nominal interest rate is not matched
3The same method is used in the open-economy model of Tervala (2010).
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by a one-for-one change in expected ination. Therefore, it lowers the real
interest rate and consumption increases in the short run. This results in a
demand-driven increase in output and employment in the short run. In the
medium run, ination has decreased the real wage below the steady state
level and output falls relative to the initial steady state. In the long run,
prices adjust and output reverts back to the original level.
Panel (d) of Figure 1 shows that a decrease in the interest rate increases
welfare in the short run, if  = 0:1. In this case, the level of employment
is lower than its socially optimal level because  < 1=. A monetary shock
brings the level of consumption and employment temporarily closer to the
social optimum, increasing welfare.
In the case of  = 0:1, welfare decreases in the medium run. The reason is
that expansionary monetary policy decreases employment and consumption
that are already ine¢ ciently low. However, the DPV of change in welfare is
positive (0.002). Therefore, the short-run welfare e¤ect of monetary policy
dominates the medium-run welfare e¤ect.
Panel (d) illustrates that a high value of  reverses the welfare e¤ects
of monetary policy. In this case, the consumption externality caused by the
keeping up with the Joneses e¤ect dominates the monopolistic competition
distortion. Therefore, the initial level of employment is higher than its so-
cially optimal level. Monetary policy that causes an increase in employment
does not bring employment closer to the social optimum, but moves it far-
ther away from it. Therefore, policy lowers welfare in the short run. In
the medium run, a decrease in employment is welfare-improving. The rea-
son is that a fall in employment temporarily mitigates the overemployment
problem. However, in the case of  = 0:2, the DPV of change in welfare is
negative (-0.001).
The ndings of this paper, regarding the overall welfare e¤ect of mon-
etary policy, are consistent with the earlier literature. Pierdzioch (2003),
Pierdzioch and Yener (2004) and Tervala (2007) have shown the dependence
of the overall welfare e¤ect of monetary policy on the interplay between the
consumption externality caused by the keeping up with the Joneses e¤ect and
the monopolistic distortion. In these papers, an exogenous rise in the money
supply can be welfare-reducing if the keeping up with the Joneses e¤ect is
su¢ ciently strong. The ndings of this paper generalise the results of the
earlier studies: If the keeping up with the Joneses e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong,
then expansionary monetary policy can reduce welfare also in the framework
where monetary policy is modelled in terms of an interest rate rule.
Moreover, this paper shows that keeping up with the Joneses preferences
have di¤erent e¤ects on welfare in the short run than in the medium run.
If the keeping up with the Joneses e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong (weak), then
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expansionary monetary policy decreases (increases) welfare in the short run.
On the other hand, if the e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong (weak), then policy
increases (decreases) welfare in the medium run. Therefore keeping up with
the Joneses preferences can reverse the welfare e¤ects of monetary policy
both in the short and medium run.
4 Conclusions
This paper analyses the welfare e¤ects of monetary policy over time, using
a simple New Keynesian model in which the central bank follows the Taylor
rule and households have the desire to keep up with the Joneses. Previous
studies have shed light only on the overall welfare, an approach that misses
the evolution of welfare over time. The results demonstrate that the inter-
play between the keeping up with the Joneses e¤ect and the monopolistic
competition distortion determines the sign of the welfare e¤ect of monetary
policy. If the keeping up with the Joneses e¤ect dominates (is dominated
by) the monopolistic competition distortion, then monetary policy expan-
sion causes an increase (decrease) in welfare in the short run but a decrease
(increase) in welfare in the medium run. The overall welfare e¤ects are con-
sistent with previous studies that have analysed the welfare e¤ects of money
supply shocks Pierdzioch (2003), Pierdzioch and Yener (2004) and Tervala
(2007)  rea¢ rming the claim that the interplay between these two factors
determines the overall welfare e¤ects of monetary policy.
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Figure 1: Dynamic E¤ects of a Decrease in the Interest Rate
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